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IN AGENTS WE TRUST—A PROPOSAL FOR
MATERIAL PARTICIPATION OF TRUSTS
Alan Wilson and Ryan Pulver*
Abstract
In the business succession planning context, estate planners frequently
employ the use of trusts to pass ownership of a business from one generation
to another. Often, the beneficiaries of such a trust include the children of the
grantor. The trust mechanism provides trustee oversight and a controlled process
for transition. In many cases, the child/trust beneficiary works in the business
and perhaps earns his or her sole income from participation in the business with
the promise of direct ownership in the future. This transition requires thorough
planning to properly pass ownership in the most tax-efficient manner.
In 2010, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) as part
of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). This amendment introduced a new tax on
“net investment income” applicable to individuals, estates, and trusts. Net
investment income includes income from a trade or business in which the taxpayer
does not “materially participate.” This raises a question regarding how a trust as
a taxpaying entity materially participates under the tax code. With Section 1411
of the Code, Congress codified a requirement to look to Section 469 (passive
activity losses) for guidance on determining material participation. Since the
1986 amendments to the Code, however, the Treasury has yet to pass regulations
defining material participation in an estate and trust context.
In an attempt to provide guidance to trustees and estate planners, this article
explores the meaning of “material participation” in the context of estates and
* Alan J. Wilson practices corporate law in Washington, D.C., with a focus on public
company counseling and SEC disclosure issues. Ryan C. Pulver is an associate at Jackson Kelly
PLLC in Charleston, WV where he is a member of the tax practice group. Both attended the West
Virginia University College of Law and were members of the West Virginia Law Review. Both would
like to thank Elaine Waterhouse Wilson and Joshua Fershee for their guidance and thoughtful input
in authoring this article.
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trusts with respect to the Net Investment Income Tax (“NIIT”). In deriving this
article’s topic from Treasury comments accompanying a final rule regarding the
NIIT, this discussion primarily responds to the Treasury’s call for comments
and guidance on “material participation” of estates and trusts and the proposed
coordination with regulations under Section 469.
Current guidance on this issue remains relatively limited, consisting of
two court opinions and administrative decisions. The trending position of the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (“Commissioner”) focuses solely
upon the actions by the trustee or other person with discretionary powers and
the ability to bind the trust. Such a position excludes trust beneficiaries that
actively participate in the business but that lack a formal “trustee” obligation.
The Commissioner’s position provides a clearly identifiable person who happens
to hold legal title to the trust interest. By focusing on the trustee, however,
the Commissioner overlooks the equitable interest of trust beneficiaries. The
involvement of beneficiaries may equal or exceed that of the trustee and may
more realistically represent the underlying economic interest of the trust. With
the passage of Section 1411, another tax is added to the debate involving the
activities of estates and trusts, and this area merits clear guidance.
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I. Introduction
Business succession planning is fraught with challenges—both personal and
financial.1 In the estate planning process, many clients’ estates consist primarily
of business interests. As a response to these challenges, estate planners often
use trusts for tax efficiency, protection from creditors, and transferor control.
Uncertainty in federal taxation makes it difficult for estate planners and business
owners to clearly evaluate the tax consequences and to plan accordingly. The
Net Investment Income Tax (“NIIT”) exemplifies the planning complications
created by uncertainty.2 For trusts and estates, no direct regulatory guidance exists
regarding application of the NIIT. Clearly, this lack of guidance poses a problem
for trusts with business interests because income derived therefrom may be subject
to the new tax.
James Olan Hutcheson, Why Succession Planning Matters, Bloomberg Businessweek
(Jul. 30, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-07-30/why-succession-planningmattersbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. As James Olan Hutcheson
noted in Bloomberg Businessweek, these challenges are often enough to bring the business asunder:
1

[T]he stakes are high—so high in fact, that most family businesses fail to negotiate the
transition and are sold either to pay taxes or because no one in the family is willing
or able to take over. Additionally, the communities of stakeholders involved in the
process can be numerous and are often in conflict.
Id.
2

I.R.C. § 1411 (2014).
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In the traditional estate planning scenario, a couple seeks legal advice to plan
for future ownership transition of the family business to their children. Numerous
challenges and opportunities exist in this planning context, which require
consideration of all forms of federal taxes—income taxes, self-employment taxes,
gift taxes, estate taxes, generation skipping taxes, and now the NIIT. A business
succession plan must be drafted carefully in order to maximize tax efficiency
with respect to the federal income tax and the federal wealth transfer tax. In
the absence of regulatory guidance, careful drafting may be unable to overcome
regulatory uncertainty.
Congress enacted the NIIT in 2010 at Section 1411 of the Internal Revenue
Code (“Code”) to apply to individuals, estates, and trusts.3 The NIIT taxes
passive activity, meaning “any activity (A) which involves the conduct of any
trade or business, and (B) in which the taxpayer does not materially participate.”4
The NIIT statutory language expressly references Section 469, which addresses
passive activity losses, for the determination of “passive activity.”5 Similarly, recent
regulatory action indicated that the Treasury plans to retain this structure, whereby
material participation for the NIIT relies on guidance under Section 469.6 This
centralizes the regulations on material participation, but for the same entity, a
trust, this centralization binds two distinct tax issues—passive activity losses and
net investment income. The question then becomes, can material participation
mean the same for both taxes? Also, with the passive activity loss section of the
Code derived from the need to close tax loopholes, should the same measures be
applied to impose tax laws?
Although Congress enacted the Section 469 passive activity loss rules in
1986, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has yet to promulgate regulations
that define material participation in the context of estates and trusts.7 As a general
matter, “material participation” refers to a level of participation by a taxpayer in
an activity, such as a trade or business.8 A taxpayer that materially participates
qualifies for special treatment under the Code, such as the ability to deduct losses
and to apply special valuation rules for small family businesses.9 As referenced,
supra, the NIIT breathes new life into the discussion about material participation
of trusts and estates as the NIIT applies to net investment income, including
that attributable to trusts and estates.10 Net investment income inherently results
3

Id. § 1411(a) (2014).

4

Id. § 469 (2014).

5

Id. § 1411(c)(2) (2014).

6

Net Investment Income Tax, 78 Fed. Reg. 72,394, 72,402 (Dec. 2, 2013).

7

Treas. Reg. § 1.469-8 (2013).

8

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 469(h) (2014).

9

See I.R.C. § 469; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T (2013).

10

See I.R.C. § 1411 (2014).
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from passive activities. If an individual, estate, or trust materially participates in an
activity, then income from that activity escapes the 3.8 percent NIIT.11
Recently promulgated regulations to Section 1411 prompted the topic of
this article.12 Within those regulations, the Treasury stated that additional
guidance on material participation was omitted from the promulgated regulations
to prevent undue delay given the complexity of the topic.13 In addition, the
Treasury stated that guidance on that topic is best coordinated by reference to the
regulations in Section 469, as referenced by the statute.14
The development of guidance with respect to the NIIT reignited
discussions among practitioners and scholars about the practical application of
the materially participates language in a traditional trust context. With little
guidance on the issue, advising clients involves some speculation on the application of the individual material participation rules to the estate and trust context.
This uncertainty impacts estate planning for higher net worth individuals trans
ferring business interests into a trust or estate, particularly family businesses.15
With many trusts holding business interests that produce income each year, the
meaning of material participation now controls more than the ability to deduct
passive activity losses under Section 469.16
The current guidance on the issue of material participation by trusts and
estates consists primarily of one decision from the Northern District of Texas, two
Technical Advice Memorandums (hereafter “TAM”), one Private Letter Ruling
(hereafter “PLR”), and one recent decision by the United States Tax Court.17

11

Id.

12

See Net Investment Income Tax, 78 Fed. Reg. at 394, 402.

13

Id.

14

I.R.C. § 1411(c)(2)(a) (2014).

See examples of guidance issued by the following lawyers: Melissa J. Willms, Davis &
Willms, PLLC, Affordable Care Act: A Trust and Estate Perspective (2013), available at http://www.
texastaxsection.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=kRyTqTPoZs4%3D&tabid=80; Legal Alert: The
3.8 Percent Net Investment Income Tax Regulations, McGuireWoods (Dec. 4, 2013), available
at http://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2013/12/The-3-8-Percent-NetInvestment-Income-Tax-Final-Regulations.aspx; Casey S. August & Daniel F. Carmody, Revisiting
Passive Activities in Light of Section 1411, Phila. Est. Plan. Council Newsl. (Spring 2013),
available at http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/publicationID/dfd2550f-7a5c-4daf-8d537d0fa9186711/fuseaction/publication.detail.
15

16
Steve R. Akers, American Bar Association, Material Participation by Trusts, Frank Aragona
Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. No. 9 (March 27, 2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/rpte_ereport/2014/2_april/te_akers.authcheckdam.pdf.
17
Carter Trust ex rel. Fortson v. United States, 256 F.Supp.2d 536 (N.D. Tex. 2003); I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 2007-33-023 (Aug. 17, 2007); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2013-17-010 (Jan. 18,
2013); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-29-014 (Apr. 7, 2010); Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C.
No. 9 (2014).
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This article analyzes the goals of the NIIT and applies the current law on material
participation to explain the NIIT’s application in different planning scenarios.
This article argues that focusing solely on the activities of one trustee overlooks
the economic realities of a trust in exchange for administrative ease of the Code.
This article then offers proposed regulatory language that would allow trustees to
count the activities of agents in determining the material participation of a trust
for purposes of both Sections 469 and 1411.

II. Background
A. Enactment of the Net Investment Income Tax to Help Fund Healthcare in
the United States
Congress enacted the NIIT through the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act as part of the implementation of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).18 The NIIT imposes a flat 3.8 percent tax on
“net investment income” with the aim of funding the expansion of Medicare
coverage mandated by the ACA.19 This tax on net investment income applies to
individuals on the lesser of investment income or the excess of modified adjusted
gross income over the threshold amount of $200,000 or $250,000 depending
upon filing status.20 For estates and trusts, the NIIT is imposed on the lesser
of undistributed net income or adjusted gross income over $11,950, the dollar
amount at which the highest estate and trust tax bracket begins in Section 1(e).21
The primary rationale for the tax is that wage earners contribute to the federal
coffers through the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”)22 payroll tax
and the self-employment tax, and no justifiable reason exists to exempt invest
18
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010).
19
156 Cong. Rec. H1891-01 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010). The actual need to fund the
additional health insurance coverage of Americans was questioned by many members of Congress,
including Walter Herger of the Ways and Means Committee: “This tax hike is aimed squarely at
small businesses and is sure to result in the loss of even more jobs. Even worse, Congress is once
again raiding the Medicare and Social Security Trust Funds to pay for other programs.” Id.
20

I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1), (b) (2014).

21

Id. §§ 1(e) (2014), 1411(b) (2014).

Amanda Stein, FICA Taxation of Post-Employment Benefits: A Statutory Puzzle and Socio
political Conundrum, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 203, 212 (2013).
22

FICA-generated revenue is credited to four separate trust funds managed by the
Department of the Treasury. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust
Fund pays retirement and survivors benefits, while the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust
Fund pays disability benefits. These two trust funds together are known as OASDI,
which collectively pay Social Security benefits. The Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust
Fund pays for inpatient hospital care, while the Supplementary Medical Insurance
(SMI) Trust Fund covers Medicare Part B and Medicare Part D.
Id.
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ment or unearned income from tax.23 Congress primarily assumes, for purposes
of the NIIT, that individuals subject to the NIIT have not contributed to FICA,
yet should.24
Members of Congress voiced concerns regarding this assumption in that,
assuming the need for Medicare funding is valid, the funds from the NIIT
do not explicitly finance Medicare or any of the expected costs of the ACA.25
Senator Snow of Maine noted, “[W]e have gone from zero to $210 billion in
new taxes in Medicare . . . not one dollar gets reinvested in Medicare . . . we
are taxing it for other purposes rather than into Medicare.”26 Other members
of Congress raised concerns over the benefits of the NIIT with regard to the
economic welfare of taxpayers subjected to this tax without a clear benefit to the
expansion of healthcare via the ACA.27 Funding Medicare has been a concern
from the program’s beginnings.28
Prior to the ACA and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act,
Medicare was largely funded by taxing wages under FICA and the self-employment
tax. For wage earners employed by an enterprise, the FICA tax is imposed on the
value of the wages and both employees and the employers split the tax burden.29
Pursuant to Section 3101(a), 6.2 percent of the wages withheld pursuant to FICA
go toward the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance.30 Currently, the maximum wage
base subject to FICA withholding for the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance is
156 Cong. Rec. S1923-08 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2010) (Senator Baucus). “Only taxes on
wages contribute to the Medicare trust fund. The thought is that people with unearned income
should also contribute.” Id.
23

24
156 Cong. Rec. H2195-03 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2010). Congressman Robert Scott stated
the following:

Whatever your earned income, you pay a Medicare taxon that income, if it’s earned
income. If it’s unearned income, stocks and bonds and trading and dividends and
interest, you don’t pay a Medicare tax on that. The major funding in this provides
that whatever your income, you will be paying a Medicare tax. So those making more
than $250,000 will pay on their unearned income just like everybody else is paying
on their earned income.
Id.
25
See 156 Cong. Rec. H1891-01 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010). Congressmen Frelinghuysen
stated his concern that senior citizens, who depend on investment income for retirement expenses,
will be hit by the tax and, thus, defeat the purpose of Medicare. Id.
26

156 Cong. Rec. S1923-08 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2010).

See 156 Cong. Rec. H2219-03 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2010). Congressman Reichert of the
Ways and Means Committee stated the following: “There is a 3.8 percent [flat] investment tax;
other penalties if you don’t provide mandated health care. This doesn’t include the $588 billion in
other tax hikes coming in December when the current tax rates expire.” Id.
27

Soc. Sec. and Medicare Bd. of Trustees, Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs:
A Summary of the 2012 Annual Social Security and Medicare Trust Fund Reports, 2 (2012), available
at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr12summary.pdf.
28

29

See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)−(b) (2014)

30

Id. § 3121(a) (2014).
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$117,000.31 Furthermore, pursuant to Section 3101(b), an additional 1.45
percent of the wages is withheld under FICA and goes toward Hospital Insurance,
otherwise known as Medicare.32 There is no maximum wage base for the Hospital
Insurance withholding portion under FICA.33
The primary impetus for using the value of wages as the tax base was that,
at the time entitlement programs were contemplated in the 1930s, ninety-five
percent of Americans did not pay federal income taxes, and policy makers feared
for the long-term financial viability of such programs.34 Because payroll taxes such
as FICA are limited to employees earning wages from an employer and not income,
Congress enacted the Self-Employment Contributions Act, which imposed the
self-employment tax.35 The self-employment tax works as a backstop to FICA tax
avoidance because its tax base is the “net earnings from self-employment” rather
than wages.36 One cannot circumvent the FICA payroll tax by simply owning
their own company and declaring dividends, which are not wages.37
As referenced, supra, Medicare funding is largely sourced from payroll taxes
due to the concerns of financial viability. A primary concern was that the federal
income tax was not sufficient to pay for such social costs.38 In light of the expansion
of the federal income tax since the 1970s, the need to use wages as the most
reliable proxy for the tax has been antiquated for decades.39 Unifying taxation
for entitlement spending such as Medicare has proven financially viable for some
time.40 Congress defined “wages” so “broadly, [as] to encompass ‘all remuneration
for employment.’”41 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he
obligation to pay the social security tax initially is not fundamentally different
from the obligation to pay income taxes; the difference—in theory at least—is
that the social security tax revenues are segregated for use only in furtherance of
31

Id. § 3121(a)(1) (2014).

32

Id. § 3121(b) (2014).

33

Id. § 3121(a)(1) (2014).

Edward D. Berkowitz, The Historical Development of Social Security in the United States, in
Social Security in the 21st Century, at 22, 24 (1996).
34

35
Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough Entities and the Self-Employment Tax: Is It Time for a Uniform
Standard?, 17 Va. Tax. Rev. 811, 819 (1998). “Under the Self-Employment Contributions Act
(“SECA”), a self-employment tax is imposed on self-employed individuals at a rate of 15.3%
–a combination of a 12.4% OASDI tax and a 2.9% Medicare tax. The tax is imposed on the
individual’s net earnings from self-employment (“NESE”).” Id.
36

See I.R.C. §§ 1401−1403.

37

See id.

38

See Berkowitz, supra note 34, at 24.

See Tax Policy Ctr., Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst., Historical Amount of Revenue by Source
(Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=203.
39

40

See id.

41

Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 709 (2011).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss1/3

8

Wilson and Pulver: In Agents We Trust - A Proposal for Material Participation of Tru

2015

In Agents We Trust

79

the statutory program.”42 Therefore, Medicare funding’s reliance on wages exists
as a deliberate omission by Congress.

B. Applying the Net Investment Income Tax, a Flat Tax Imposed on Passive
Income with Various Carve-Outs
As noted, supra, Section 1411 imposes the NIIT on individuals, trusts,
and estates.43 Section 1411 only specifically addresses the tax base of a trust,
however, it does not expressly define what constitutes passive income. Section
1411(c)(2)(A) states that the NIIT applies to income from “[a] trade or business
[that] is described in this paragraph if such trade or business is . . . a passive
activity (within the meaning of [S]ection 469) with respect to the taxpayer.”44
Section 1411 directly implicates the material participation or materially participates
language from Section 469.45 The law on material participation determines the
effect on the inclusion or exclusion of certain transactions for purposes of the
NIIT.46 Section 1411 also expressly provides a charitable exclusion from the NIIT
for trusts in which “all of the unexpired interests” are dedicated for one or more
of the following purposes: “religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”47

C. Fragmented Guidance Surrounds Material Participation Under
Section 469
1. The Development of Section 469
The statutory guidance for material participation under Section 1411 stems
directly from Section 469.48 Section 469 defines a “passive activity” as “any activity
42

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).

43

I.R.C. § 1411(a)(2) (2014).

44

Id. § 1411(c)(2)(A) (2014).

45

See id.

46

See id. §§ 1411(c)(2)(A) (2014), 469(c) (2014).

47

Id. §§ 170(c)(2)(B) (2014), 1411(e)(2) (2014).

See id. § 1411(c)(2) (2014). Note that “material participation” appears in other sections of
the Code; see id. § 1402 (self-employment tax); id. § 2032A (estate tax special use valuation rules).
Cases under §§ 1402 and 2032A do not directly apply to §§ 469 and 1411 because the standard
for material participation differs for each type of tax. In § 2032A(e)(12), more direct hands-on
involvement is required as material participation involves the making of a business’ management
decisions other than daily operating decisions. Section 1402 uses a facts and circumstances analysis,
and § 469 conducts a facts and circumstances analysis to determine if participation is “(A) regular,
(B) continuous, and (C) substantial.” § 469(h)(1). For § 469, Congress indicated that precedents
for § 2032A and § 1402 do not control as precedent. See S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 732
(1986); W. Ralph Rodgers, Jr., Material Participation Under the Passive Activity Loss Provisions, 39
U. Fla. L. Rev. 1083, 1085 (1987).
48
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(A) which involves the conduct of any trade or business, and (B) in which the
taxpayer does not materially participate.”49 Congress enacted Section 469 as part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to eliminate abusive tax shelters.50 Specifically,
Section 469 aimed to close tax loopholes where taxpayers could have offset
ordinary income with losses from an enterprise in which they had no “substantial
and bona fide involvement.”51 The central direction taken by Section 469 includes
the suspension of losses from “passive activities,” which encompasses income from
a trade or business in which a taxpayer does not materially participate.52
Prior to Section 469, a high-income taxpayer could obtain a limited
partnership interest that produced little earnings but a great deal of deductions,
such as depreciation.53 These deductions flowed through to the taxpayer’s
individual income tax return and reduced the taxpayer’s taxable income. These
losses, however, were not economic in the sense of a lost investment, but were
rather phantom losses to reflect changes in value. “Congress wanted to restrict
the availability of tax preferences to a certain category of taxpayers. In Section
469, Congress used material participation as a tool for identifying this category
of taxpayers.”54 For individuals, the Treasury promulgated regulations that govern
material participation.55 For estates and trusts, the Treasury reserved a section
49

I.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (2014).

50

Rodgers, supra note 48.

See S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 713–14 (1986). “Section 469 therefore was
enacted to restore public confidence in the Federal tax system by limiting the extent to which certain
taxpayers could offset ordinary income with losses arising from activities in which they did not have
‘a substantial and bona fide involvement.’” Adler v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 736, 738 (1995)
(citing S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 713–14).
51

I.R.C. § 469; see generally Nina J. Crim & Ryan R. Brenneman, Tax Sheltering of Income:
Passive Losses Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 4 Akron Tax J. 101 (1987) (noting the views
Congress surrounding the passage of § 469 and the impact of § 469 on business interests).
52

Lee Knight & Ray Knight, What Happened to Limited Partnerships: The Jewel of the 1980s
has Lost its Brilliance, J. Acct., July 1997, available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Issues/1997/Jul/knight.htm. (describing the heyday of limited partnerships between 1983 and
1989, in which brokerage houses heavily marketed limited partnership interests in oil and gas,
real estate, and cattle farming operations with the promise of enormous tax savings via flowthrough taxation).
53

54

Rodgers, supra note 48, at 1089.

55

See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) (2013).
[F]or purposes of section 469 and the regulations thereunder, as materially
participating in an activity for the taxable year if and only if—
(1) The individual participates in the activity for more than 500 hours during
such year;
(2) The individual’s participation in the activity for the taxable year constitutes
substantially all of the participation in such activity of all individuals (including
individuals who are not owners of interests in the activity) for such year;
(3) The individual participates in the activity for more than 100 hours during the
taxable year, and such individual’s participation in the activity for the taxable
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of the regulations for guidance, but that section remains empty with no rule
promulgated to date.

2. Evolving Guidance Under Section 469 Regarding Material
Participation in the Context of Estates and Trusts
For material participation of trusts under Section 469, scant guidance
includes two decisions, one by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas and the other by the United States Tax Court.56 In addition,
guidance includes some administrative decisions by the Internal Revenue
Service (the “IRS”). The IRS, through its TAMs, has not addressed whether actions
by individuals other than the trustee may be considered material participation.
The TAMs have, however, provided thresholds for which the IRS considers
sufficient participation on the part of the trustee for material participation. The
following explanation illustrates the evolution of current guidance pertaining to
material participation.

a. 2003: Carter Trust v. United States
From 1986 to 2003, estates and trusts operated without any direct guidance
on the material participation of such entities.57 The Mattie K. Carter Trust first
litigated the issue in the Northern District of Texas in 2003. In Mattie K. Carter
Trust v. United States,58 the IRS took the position that “material participation”
year is not less than the participation in the activity of any other individual
(including individuals who are not owners of interests in the activity) for
such year;
(4) The activity is a significant participation activity (within the meaning of
paragraph (c) of this section) for the taxable year, and the individual’s aggregate
participation in all significant participation activities during such year exceeds
500 hours;
(5) The individual materially participated in the activity (determined without regard
to this paragraph (a)(5)) for any five taxable years (whether or not consecutive)
during the ten taxable years that immediately precede the taxable year;
(6) The activity is a personal service activity (within the meaning of paragraph (d)
of this section), and the individual materially participated in the activity for any
three taxable years (whether or not consecutive) preceding the taxable year; or
(7) Based on all of the facts and circumstances (taking into account the rules in
paragraph (b) of this section), the individual participates in the activity on a
regular, continuous, and substantial basis during such year.
Id.
56
Please note that the American Bar Association Section of Taxation has issued comments,
which do not represent a formal opinion of the American Bar Association, as to how the Treasury
Department could provide further guidance on material participation. The Section of Taxation’s
comment provides valuable background and adds to the discussion within this context.
57

See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 100 Stat. 2085.

58

Mattie K. Carter Trust v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
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with regard to a trust depended on the activities of the trustee.59 The case involved
a testamentary trust, which held a ranch as a primary asset. The ranch’s full-time
ranch manager and other full- and part-time employees conducted nearly all of
the ranch’s activities.60 The court disagreed with the IRS: “[M]aterial participation
of [the] Trust in the ranch operations should be determined by reference to the
persons who conducted the business of the ranch on [the] Trust’s behalf.”61 The
Carter court relied on the plain language of Section 469, which says that “a
trust is a taxpayer and that a taxpayer is treated as materially participating in a
business if its activities in pursuit of that business are regular, continuous, and
substantial.”62 In drawing this distinction, the court concurred with the taxpayer,
which analogized its trust operations to that of a closely held C Corporation:
The Trust, however, is very similar to a closely held C corpora
tion. The Trustee, like the board of directors of a C corporation,
has the fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries of the Trust for
the benefit of such beneficiaries. Moreover, the Trust, like a
C corporation, is a legal entity and is subject to entity-level U.S.
federal income taxes. In addition, and most importantly, as a
legal entity, the Trust, like a C corporation, can act only through
its fiduciaries, employees and agents. Therefore, the Trust is
most analogous to a closely held C corporation.63
This analogy was not directly invoked in later decisions, but it provides a helpful
construct by which to contextualize the abstract nature of the trust.64

b. 2007: Technical Advice Memorandum 200733023
Despite the holding in Carter Trust, in 2007 the IRS disagreed in TAM
200733023, in which it assessed the activities of the trustee for the purposes
of material participation under Section 469.65 In this TAM, the IRS provided
additional guidance and imputed the general material participation rules for
individuals to trusts via trustees.66 This TAM involved a testamentary trust that
held a partnership interest.67 The trustee contracted “special trustees” to meet
the Section 469(h)(1) material participation test of “regular, continuous, and
59

Id. at 541.

60

Id. at 538.

61

Id. at 541.

62

Id. at 540–41 (internal citations omitted).

63

Id. at 541 n.3 (citing Am. Br. to Carter Trust Mot. at 21).

64

See infra notes 97–158 and accompanying text.

65

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2007-33-023 (Aug. 17, 2007).

66

Id.

67

Id.
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substantial.”68 The contract provided that the trustee retained all decision-making
powers with respect to “financial, tax, and business” matters. The IRS concluded
that the “[t]rust did not materially participate . . . because [the] Special Trustees
in this case [were] not fiduciaries for purposes of 469 and Trustees’ involvement in
the operations of Business . . . [were] not regular, continuous, and substantial.”69
In reaching its conclusion, the IRS interpreted then-existing guidance to suggest
that “[w]hat is apparent from the line of authority in this area is that a fiduciary
must be vested with some degree of discretionary power to act on behalf of the
trust.”70 For a special trustee’s activities to count toward the trust activities, such
special trustee must not “lack any indicia of discretionary power,” or in other
words, must have the ability to bind the trust in some way.71

c. 2010: Private Letter Ruling 201029014 and Estate of
Strangeland v. Commissioner
Three years later, in PLR 201029014, the IRS reiterated its position in TAM
200733023. In the PLR, a taxpayer sought advice on the material participation
of the trust with respect to a subsidiary of a subsidiary of the partnership held
in the complex trust. The IRS noted that for individuals, the quantitative test
for material participation in Temporary Treasury Regulation Sections 1.4695T(a)(1)–(7) has largely replaced the Section 469(h)(1) “regular, continuous
and substantial” qualitative test for material participation. With respect to
attributing the activity of agents, the IRS reasoned, “[a]s a general matter, the
owner of a business may not look to the activities of the owner’s employees to
satisfy the material participation requirement.”72 Despite that reference to the
legislative history, the IRS concluded that the trust may materially participate in
the subsidiary of a subsidiary “if the trustee . . . is involved in the operations of
[the subsidiary of a subsidiary]’s activities on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis.”73
Later in 2010, the United States Tax Court avoided directly answering whether
the activities of a person other than the trustee could count for determining
material participation of a trust in the passive activity loss context. In Estate of
Strangeland v. C.I.R.,74 the Tax Court held that the taxpayer, an estate, could not
take passive losses pursuant to Section 469.75 The trust involved in the dispute had
68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-29-014 (Apr. 7, 2010) (citing S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 735
(1986)) (“‘the activities of [employees] . . . are not attributed to the taxpayer.’”).
72

73

Id.

74

Estate of Strangeland v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 156 (2010).

75

Id. at 11.
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one trustee, the wife of the decedent, who performed no management activities
with respect to the trust asset, meaning that she did not materially participate
under Section 469.76 However, another individual close to the decedent main
tained the assets in the trust, and arguably, materially participated.77 That court
avoided the issue by stating that it did not need to “address whether or how a
trust may materially participate in an activity because [it] conclude[d] that
petitioners . . . failed to prove [the non-trustee’s] relationship with the trust.”78

d. 2013: Technical Advice Memorandum 201317010
Three years later in 2013, the IRS issued TAM 201317010, in which it
addressed the activities of a special trustee for the purposes of “material participation”
under Section 469.79 The IRS again concluded that a trust materially participates
if the “fiduciaries of the trust participate in the operations of the activity.”80
In reaching its conclusion, the IRS evaluated the facts presented involving
two complex trusts, both created on the same day with interests in the same
S Corporation, which wholly owned an S Corporation subsidiary.81 The trust
instrument appointed a beneficiary of the trust as the special trustee who had
control over “all decisions regarding the sale or retention of such stock and all
voting of such stock.”82 “The trust agreements [did] not grant any further fiduciary
powers over the Trusts’ assets or with respect to the operations or management of
the Trusts to . . . the Special Trustee.”83
The IRS relied on the following legislative history of Section 469, “[s]pecial
rules apply in the case of taxable entities that are subject to the passive loss rule. A
trust or estate is treated as materially participating in an activity . . . if an executor
or fiduciary, in his capacity as such, is so participating.”84 The IRS next defined
“fiduciary” under Section 7701 and the relevant case law.85 The IRS ultimately
held that the special trustee did not materially participate “because the Trustee

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at. 15.

79

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2013-17-010 (Jan. 18, 2013).

80

Id. (emphasis added).

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

The IRS explained its definition of “fiduciary” as follows:
Section 7701(a)(6) defines “fiduciary” as a “guardian, trustee, executor, administrator,
receiver, conservator, or any person acting in any fiduciary capacity for any person.”
The regulations further provide that “fiduciary” refers to “persons who occupy
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and Special Trustee, in their capacity as trustees of [the trusts], were not involved
in the operations of [S Corporations’] relevant activities on a regular, continuous,
and substantial basis during the tax years at issue.86 The Special Trustee,
moreover, lacked the power to commit either trust to any course of action,
control trust property beyond selling, or vote the stock of the S Corporation or
its subsidiary.87 The TAM suggests that a special trustee would qualify as a fiduciary
capable of materially participating for a trust if such special trustee holds an
indicia of discretionary power such as to bind the trust.88

e. 2014: Frank Aragona Trust v. Commissioner
Most recently, the United States Tax Court held that trusts can materially
participate via the actions of multiple trustees for the purposes of Section 469.89
Frank Aragona Trust involved “a complex residuary trust that own[ed] rental realestate properties and [was] involved in other real-estate business activities such
as holding real estate and developing real estate.”90 The trust had six trustees,
five of whom were the children of the settlor, and one who was an independent
trustee and attorney.91 Three of the five children worked full-time for a limited
liability company wholly owned by the trust, one was a dentist, and the other
was disabled.92 The court held that a trust can materially participate through
the activities of its trustees acting as employees where the operations of the trust
were substantial and those operations required the full-time attention of the
trustees.93 The court noted, “it is impossible to disaggregate the activities [the
trustees] performed as employees of [the business in trust], and the activities
they performed as trustees.”94 Notably, the “trustees handled practically no other
businesses on behalf of the trust.”95
Frank Aragona Trust establishes two preliminary canons regarding a trust’s
ability to materially participate: (1) dual status trustee/employees can be factored

positions of peculiar confidence toward others, such as trustees, executors, and
administrators.” To date, the Service has issued only limited guidance expounding
upon the definition of fiduciary under § 7701(a)(6).
Id.
86

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2013-17-010 (Jan. 18, 2013).

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

See Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. No. 9 (2014).

90

Id. at *3.

91

Id. at *1.

92

Id.

93

Id. at *8–9.

94

Id. at *7.

95

Id. at *8.
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into the calculus of whether or not the trust itself materially participates; and
(2) in the situations involving multiple trustee/beneficiaries who reap benefits
from the trust, not all the trustee/beneficiaries need to materially participate.96
Taken together, these TAMs and cases leave a number of questions
unanswered. First, a trust can materially participate through the activities of
its trustee(s), but to what extent can the activities of individuals the trustee has
delegated be attributed to the trustee(s) for the purposes of material participation?
Second, if an individual must be a trustee for that individual’s activity to count
toward material participation, does an inequity result? Theoretically, a trust
that appoints an independent trustee instead of a trustee-beneficiary may owe
the NIIT even if the beneficiaries meet the material participation test for individuals under Section 469. Last, is Section 469 an appropriate mechanism for
applying the material participation standard to the NIIT?97 As discussed, supra,
this article seeks to prescribe regulations that answer these questions and assists in
providing continuity in administration of the NIIT.

III. Analysis: The Dichotomy of Control vs. Economic Interests,
a Case Illustration
Limited guidance exists to determine the material participation of trusts.98
Current guidance takes somewhat conflicting positions and creates greater
uncertainty for trustees, beneficiaries, and estate planners. The following
discussion focuses on the difference between control and economic interests. In
so doing, the discussion begins with an outline of typical trust arrangements,
then compiles current material participation guidance as applied to those trust
arrangements, and further explores the analogy raised in Carter Trust between
trusts and closely held corporations.

A. Contextual Illustration of the Net Investment Income Tax with Variations
of Trusts
The following contextual scenarios present tools commonly employed in
estate and business succession planning, which feature different tax characteristics
that could influence the focus for determining the participation level of a trust.
The examples include a Qualified Terminable Interest Property (“QTIP”) Trust,
a Qualified Subchapter S Trust (“QSST”), and an Electing Small Business Trust
(“ESBT”). For purposes of the QTIP analysis, this article presumes that the asset

96

Id.

Id. at *7 n.12 (noting, “A number of commentators have argued that there is a need for a
regulation that resolves questions regarding material participation of trusts and generally coordinates
the passive-activity-loss rules of sec. 469 with the rules on taxation of trusts in subch. J.”).
97

98

See supra notes 57–97 and accompanying text.
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placed into trust is a business enterprise, taxed as a C Corporation, S Corporation, or
partnership.99 The QSST and ESBT examples both involve S Corporation stock.100

1. Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trust (“QTIP Trust”)
A decedent may claim the estate or gift tax marital deduction for property that
passes from the decedent into a QTIP trust if three requirements are met. First,
the trust provides the surviving spouse with “all the income from the property,
payable annually or at more frequent intervals . . . .”101 Second, “no person has a
power to appoint any part of the property to any person other than the surviving
spouse . . . .”102 Third, the decedent’s executor makes the QTIP election on the
decedent’s estate tax return.103
The QTIP trust offers the decedent spouse the ability to provide an income
stream for the surviving spouse, while still controlling the ultimate recipients of the
trust corpus.104 Rather than transfer assets outright to use the martial deduction,
the QTIP trust enables the decedent spouse to effect control over the ultimate
disposition of his or her assets when used in business succession planning.
For income tax purposes, amounts that are “paid, credited, or required to be
distributed” to the beneficiary are included in the gross income of the beneficiary
for income tax purposes.105 Under Section 469, the surviving spouse’s ability to
take losses in this scenario would depend upon the participation of the surviving
spouse as an individual.106

99
See I.R.C. § 11 (2014) (imposing tax on corporations); id. § 1366 (imposing tax on S Corporations); id. §702 (describing distributable income of partners). The American Bar Association
Tax Section has suggested that a separate body of rules on material participation be promulgated
to address the distinctions between these trust entities and the tax applicable to them. See Letter
from Armando Gomez, Chair, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, to The Honorable
John Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 29, 2015), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/taxation/policy/012015comments.authcheck
dam.pdf. The authors believe that such alternative approaches merit consideration, but are beyond
the scope of this article.
100
QSST and ESBTs both exist to hold S Corporation stock without compromising the
Subchapter S election.
101

I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (2014).

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id. § 662(a)(1) (2014).

See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)–(d) (2013) (providing examples of material partici
pation for individuals).
106
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2. Trusts for S Corporation Stock
a. Qualified Subchapter S Trust (“QSST”)
In general, S Corporation shareholders must be individuals.107 In 1982,
Congress created the QSST to enable owners of S Corporation stock to place
such stock in a specific trust that would not violate the S Corporation rules
regarding qualified stockholders.108 This trust mechanism enables a donor to place
S Corporation stock in trust and to name a single income beneficiary. In order to
qualify as a QSST, the trust must satisfy the requirements set forth in Section 1361:
(A) the terms of which require that—
(i) during the life of the current income beneficiary, there
shall be only 1 income beneficiary of the trust,
(ii) any corpus distributed during the life of the current income beneficiary may be distributed only to
such beneficiary,
(iii) the income interest of the current income beneficiary
in the trust shall terminate on the earlier of such
beneficiary’s death or the termination of the trust, and
(iv) upon the termination of the trust during the life of the
current income beneficiary, the trust shall distribute all
of its assets to such beneficiary, and
(B) all of the income (within the meaning of Section 643(b))
of which is distributed (or required to be distributed)
currently to 1 individual who is a citizen or resident of the
United States.109
The QSST election must be made by the trust income beneficiary rather
than by the trustee.110 For S Corporation stock placed in a QSST, the income
beneficiary is the deemed owner of the stock and is considered to be the S

107

I.R.C. § 661 (2014).

108

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–34, 1981 95 Stat.172.

Id. § 1361(d)(3)(A)–(B). Note that a QTIP trust, as described above, may also qualify as a
QSST if it meets both requirements, which overlap by requiring only one income beneficiary.
109

110

Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(7)(i) (2008).
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Corporation shareholder.111 Items of income from the S Corporation are reported
on Form K-1 and included in the income beneficiary’s individual income tax
return on IRS Form 1040.112 However, when the QSST sells S Corporation stock
and the income beneficiary is the deemed owner by statute but does not have the
power to vest trust corpus or income in himself, then any gain recognized on sale
is gross income to the trust.113 The QSST must report income on a Form 1041,
but items of income are reported on the income beneficiary’s return.114
Planners often use QSSTs to transfer S Corporation stock to one income
beneficiary. If the grantor desired to provide income to the surviving spouse and
then pass the assets to the marital children, a QTIP/QSST would be advisable
from an income tax perspective and from a non-tax perspective for purposes
of controlling the disposition. Where the grantor does not wish to pass the S
Corporation stock to the surviving spouse for income tax purposes, the grantor
can use a QSST to transfer the S Corporation stock and to use the unified credit.

b. Electing Small Business Trusts (“ESBT”)
Until 1996, S Corporation stockholders could not pass their stock to more
than one income beneficiary without creating multiple QSSTs.115 In 1996,
Congress amended the Code to permit ESBTs, an additional type of trust that
may hold S-Corporation stock and permits more than one current income
beneficiary.116 Similar to QSSTs, the requirements for ESBTs are also codified in
Section 1361:
(i)

such trust does not have as a beneficiary any person
other than
(I)

an individual,

(II) an estate,
(III) an organization described in paragraph (2), (3),
(4), or (5) of Section 170 (c) [charities], or (IV) an
organization described in Section 170 (c)(1) which
111
Id. Section 678 says that where a person other than the trust grantor has the power to
vest trust corpus or income in himself, such person is deemed to own those trust assets and that
income earned thereon is taxed to such person. See I.R.C.§ 678(a) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)
(8) (2008).
112

I.R.C. § 1361(d)(1)(B) (2014).

113

Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(8) (2008).

114

Id. § 1.1361-1(j)(7).

Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–188, § 1302, 110 Stat. 1755
(adding electing small business trusts to § 1361 of the Code).
115

116

See id.; § 1361(e) (2014).
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holds a contingent interest in such trust and is not a
potential current beneficiary,
(ii)

no interest in such trust was acquired by purchase, and

(iii) an election under this subsection applies to such trust.117
Unlike a QSST, where income from an S Corporation flows through to the
income beneficiary, income from S Corporation stock held in an ESBT is taxed at
the trust level at the highest marginal income tax rate.118 The material participation
rules more directly affect ESBTs because the Code treats S Corporation stock in an
ESBT as a separate trust for calculating income tax, apart from other trust income,
without allowing a deduction for distribution deductions.119 For calculating the
NIIT, the adjusted gross income of both trust portions is aggregated to determine
the adjusted gross income of the trust.120
To qualify as an ESBT, the trustee, unlike in the QSST context, must make
the ESBT election.121 Because an ESBT has fewer restrictions than a QSST,
a QSST may elect to become an ESBT, but an ESBT cannot elect to become
a QSST.
ESBTs offer planners a less restrictive option for holding S Corporation stock.
However, shareholders of an S Corporation held in an ESBT are determined by
reference to potential current beneficiaries (“PCBs”). These PCBs may fluctuate
over time. Given that S Corporations may only have up to 100 shareholders,
planners must remain cognizant of the number of actual beneficiaries and PCBs
to avoid losing the S Corporation election.122
Notwithstanding the concern over maintaining the S Corporation election,
estate planners can form an ESBT to pass S Corporation stock to multiple bene
ficiaries, employing a trustee to spray or sprinkle distributions. The administrative
ease of forming an ESBT may outweigh paying taxes on S Corporation income at
the highest trust tax bracket.

B. Who, What, and Why
With the typical estate planning tools in mind, the following section responds
to the concerns outlined by the American Bar Association in its response to the
117

I.R.C. § 1361(e) (2014).

118

Id. §§ 641(c)(1)(A) (2014); 641(c)(2)(C).

119

Id. § 641(c)(1).

120

Treas. Reg. § 1.1411-3(c)(2) (2013) (calculating NIIT).

121

I.R.C. § 1361(e)(3) (2014).

122

Id. § 1361(b)(1)(A).
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Treasury’s request for comments regarding material participation. Those concerns
include the following:
1. Whose participation is relevant to a determination of
whether the estate or trust materially participates in
the activity?
2. What are the relevant actions of those persons toward
material participation?
3. What level of action is required to constitute material
participation?123

1. Whose Activity and in What Capacity?
Current guidance suggests that the activities of fiduciaries of the trust count
for material participation purposes. Per the IRS, this includes “special trustees”
to the extent such trustees hold some discretionary powers over the trust.124 This
remains undecided by the Tax Court. Despite the focus in Frank Aragona Trust
on the activities of the trustees, the court in that case did not address “whether
the activities of the trust’s non-trustee employees should be disregarded.”125
Frank Aragona Trust holds that the activities of an employee/trustee cannot
be disaggregated. Thus, because the trustee cannot forego his or her fiduciary
duties, work performed in the business, even as an employee, counts for material
participation.126 Of course, the Commissioner would counter by asserting first
that trusts cannot materially participate, and second that even if they could, only
the activities of the trustee count for material participation. Given that Carter
Trust has not been expressly overruled, that holding may still survive as the
jurisprudence evolves in this area. Arguably, Carter Trust’s holding recognizes the
economic reality of trust arrangements with business enterprises held therein.127
Material participation in the trust context for purposes of Section 1411
predominantly affects whether the trust pays the NIIT on undistributed net
investment income. If a trust holds a portfolio of publicly traded securities, in
most cases such a trust would not be able to materially participate in these business

123
Section of Real Property, Trust, and Estate Law, Am. Bar. Assoc., Comments on
Internal Revenue Code Section 1411 with Respect to an Estate or Trust; Corresponding
Request to Open a Treasury Regulations Project Under Section 469, at 2 (Mar. 6, 2014),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=IRS-2013-0042-0016.
124

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2007-33-023 (Aug. 17, 2007).

125

Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. No. 9, *8, n.15 (2014).

126

Id. at *7.

127

See Carter Trust ex rel. Fortson v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
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ventures. The contemplated scenario involves trusts with smaller, generally closely
held businesses passing from one family generation to another. Given the context
in which trust beneficiaries may play roles in the business, guidance from Section
2032A may provide some additional guidance. As discussed in Part IV.B.2,
infra, those likely able to avoid the NIIT via material participation are akin to
the beneficiaries of the proverbial “small family business and farm” that Section
2032A seeks to protect. Perhaps the best approach would be the more stringent
Section 2032A requirements that look to the making of a business’ management
decisions other than daily operating decisions.
The concern that individuals other than trustees could materially participate
may be unfounded. A trustee likely would not abuse the rule by hiring multitudes of agents because of limits imposed by trust laws governing trustees and the
financial limitations of such conduct. The Uniform Trust Code, which is broader
and more permissive than the common law, provides, “[a] trustee may delegate
duties and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly
delegate under the circumstances.”128 Arguably, a trustee would breach his or her
fiduciary duties if he or she delegated duties and powers to multiple agents solely
to satisfy the material participation requirement for trusts. Even if a prudent trustee
would engage in such conduct, trustees owe a duty of prudent administration,
which would limit the amount of financial resources a trustee could spend on
agents to simply meet a material participation test.129 By considering the activities
of the trustee and the trustee’s agents who take part in the operation of the
business, the Code would avoid imposition of the NIIT on trusts that materially
participate for all intents and purposes.

2. What Actions Count Toward Material Participation?
Because the trust, as a taxpayer, acts through individuals, actions by individuals
are attributed to the trust. Under this regime, a fiduciary of a trust could reference
the regulations applicable to individuals for material participation in paragraphs
(a) through (d) of Treasury Regulation Section 1.469-5T.130 Of note, the IRS in
TAM 200733023 indicated that certain activities and time spent negotiating the
sale of trust assets would not count toward material participation.131 This generally
comports with the Internal Revenue Manual guidance on passive activity losses,
which illustrates “investor-type activities” and notes that such activities do not

128

Unif. Trust Code § 807(a) (2010).

See id. § 804 (“A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering
the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying
this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”).
129

130
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T; see also Internal Revenue Serv., Passive Activity Loss, Audit
Technique Guide, 4–14, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-mssp/pal.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,
2014) (providing a decision tree for auditors to determine material participation for § 469).
131

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2007-33-023 (Aug. 17, 2007).
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count toward material participation.132 Similarly, in Carter Trust, the trustee’s
permissible activities included many duties related to managing a cattle business:
I was chosen to be Trustee because of my extensive business,
managerial, and financial experience. My duties include
reviewing and approving all financial and operating proposals
for the Ranch and the Trust, budget and budgeting for the
Ranch, all investment decisions for the Trust, asset acquisition and sales, supervising all employees and agents of the
Trust and the Trust’s service providers, reviewing all financial
information, and responsibility for all banking relationships of
the Trust. My duties and responsibilities as Trustee routinely
require a significant percentage of my time and attention, and
I maintain regular office hours during which I am consulted
regarding any Trust matter that arises.133
In the real estate context, work performed by a trustee as an employee of the
business interest held in trust counts toward material participation where that
work involves routine management of the business and is performed on a regular,
consistent, and substantial basis.134
However, unlike the 500-hour rule in Treasury Regulation Section 1.4695T(a)(1), some of the other material participation tests for individuals do not
lend themselves to aggregation.135 That presents no major issue, however, as
the other tests arise in the context of single individual activity, which could,
for purposes of Section 1411, satisfy the material participation requirement for
the trust.136 As held in Frank Aragona Trust, not all trustees of a trust need to
materially participate in order to satisfy the material participation requirements.
The Frank Aragona Trust court, however, left an open question regarding
the point at which trustee action or inaction, in the aggregate, constitutes
material participation.

132

Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 130, at 4-8 to 4-11.

133

Carter Trust ex rel. Fortson v. United States, 256 F.Supp.2d 536, 538 (N.D. Tex. 2003).

Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. No. 9, *1 (2014). Please note that special regulations govern material participation in the real estate context, which is presumed to be passive activity.
134

135
See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(2) (2013) (“The individual’s participation in
the activity for the taxable year constitutes substantially all of the participation in such activity of
all individuals (including individuals who are not owners of interests in the activity) for such
year . . . .”); id. § 1.469-5T(a)(3) (“not less than any other individual”).

See, e.g., id. § 1.469-5T(a)(2) (“The individual’s participation in the activity for the taxable
year constitutes substantially all of the participation in such activity of all individuals (including
individuals who are not owners of interests in the activity) for such year . . . .”).
136
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3. What Degree of Action Is “Regular, Continuous, and Substantial”?
In its TAMs, PLRs, and positions advanced in adjudicated disputes, the IRS
continues to posit that a trust materially participates if the trustee “participates
in the activity on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis during such year.”
This language, derived from Treasury Regulation Section 1.469-5T(a)(7),
requires explanation. The regulation continues to provide that a person does not
materially participate if such person does not spend at least 100 hours per year on
the activity.137 Furthermore, management of the activity must pass certain tests to
count toward the material participation requirement:
(ii) Certain management activities. An individual’s services
performed in the management of an activity shall not be
taken into account in determining whether such individual
is treated as materially participating in such activity for the
taxable year under paragraph (a)(7) of this section unless,
for such taxable year—
(A) No person (other than such individual) who performs
services in connection with the management of the activity
receives compensation described in section 911(d)(2)(A)
in consideration for such services; and
(B) No individual performs services in connection with the
management of the activity that exceed (by hours) the
amount of such services performed by such individual.

C. Analogizing the Fiduciary Duty Between Trustees and Trusts and
Executors and Estates to Agents and Corporations
As a general matter, a trust is a “fiduciary relationship in which one person
holds a property interest, subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use that
interest for the benefit of another.”138 Under the Code, trust taxation depends
upon the terms of the trust document, with the major categories including grantor
trusts, non-grantor trusts, and foreign trusts.139 Special trust rules apply to certain
trusts, for example, charitable trusts, pre-need funeral trusts, and alimony trusts.
For purposes of establishing a framework, some similarities exist between a trust
and a closely held corporation.
The Mattie K. Carter Trust in Carter Trust argued that the activities of the
trustee and agents thereof resembled a closely held corporation. Trusts certainly
137

Id. § 1.469-5T(b)(2)(iii).

138

George G. Bogert et al., Cases and Text on the Law of Trusts 2 (9th ed. 2012).

139

See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 641–692 (2014) (Subchapter J).
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differ from corporations in many respects, including fiduciary duties. However,
clear parallels exist when viewing a trust as an entity. Trusts, like corporations,
depend upon affiliates in order to operate.140 In the case of corporations,
the affiliates are agents acting as officers, all of whom have fiduciary duties to
the corporation, and can delegate responsibilities to employees.141 Similarly,
trustees acting as fiduciaries to the trusts and beneficiaries may delegate their
responsibilities, but in a much more limited manner.142 Executors of estates also
have fiduciary duties to the estate and to the beneficiaries to protect and distribute
property within the estate in a similar manner as trustees with regard to trusts.143
As Carter Trust illustrated, some corporate agents have similar, but lesser, fiduciary
duties to corporations as compared to trustees and executors with respect to trusts
and estates.144 Nevertheless, trustees acting as employees fall outside of the scope of
a pure fiduciary in assessing activities for the purposes of Section 469 because it is
“impossible to disaggregate the activities [that trustees perform] as employees.”145
In drawing the equivalence between the fiduciary duties of agents with regard
to corporations and trustees and executors with regard to trusts and estates, it
becomes clear that the actions of the fiduciary—either as an agent, trustee, or
executor—are for the benefit of a separate entity. The common law recognizes that
the actions of a fiduciary, whether an agent, trustee, or executor, are an extension
of the principal when the fiduciary acts in a fiduciary capacity.146 However, the
actions of an extension do not reflect the totality of the actions of the entity:
corporations may have multiple agents, trustees may engage the assistance
of others for the benefit of their respective trusts in limited capacities,147 and
executors may require the assistance of professionals in administering an estate.148
In this sense, the individual actions of fiduciaries are encapsulated as actions of the
entity as a whole.

140

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 70 (2007).

See Ripley v. Storer, 139 N.Y.S.2d 786, (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff ’d, 142 N.Y.S.2d 269 (App.
Div. 1955); Kaplan v. Block, 31 S.E.2d 893 (Va. 1944).
141

142
See Unif. Trust Code § 807 (2010); cf. Restatement (First) of Trusts § 171 (1935) (explicitly forbidding trustees from delegation).
143
See In re Estate of Campbell, 692 A.2d 1098, 1102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); see also FCLT
Loans, L.P. v. Estate of Bracher, 93 S.W.3d 469, 480-83 (Tex. App. 2002); see also Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 191B § 13 (2013) (powers Alternative A).
144
See generally Carter Trust ex rel. Fortson v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536 (N.D.
Tex. 2003).
145

Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. No. 9, *7 (2014).

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 77 (2007); Restatement (Second)
§ 383 (1958); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 385 (1958).
146

147

See Unif. Trust Code § 807 (2000) (delegation by trustee).

148

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 80 (2007).
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This is reflected in the Code: the corporate federal income tax, unless S
Corporation status has been elected, is imposed on the corporation itself rather
than officers or other agents.149 The separateness of corporate entities from agents
who largely account for the operations of the entity has been firmly established.
In Maxwell v. C.I.R., corporate officers in a closely held corporation who were
agents of the corporation successfully sued for injuries sustained on corporate
premises as agents of the corporation.150 As corporate officers, they deducted the
costs of the lawsuit.151 The Code goes so far as to not only tax corporations on
the income brought in by its agents, but also on the income of its subsidiaries in
many cases.152
Similarly, so long as the trust is not a grantor trust, it is a separate taxable
entity for income tax purposes.153 Trusts depend upon trustees to maintain the
trust and assist the trust in earning income.154 Much like agents of corporations,
trustees generally remain free from liability for actions done on behalf of the trust
so long as the trustee acts in accordance with his or her fiduciary duties.155 Actions
against the trustee for acts committed outside the scope of his or her fiduciary
duties likewise cannot reach assets held by the trust.156 Agents of corporations
and trustees of trusts are sufficiently similar with regard to both tax and general
liability to the extent that the actions of trustees, like an agent of a corporation,
act as proxies for the trust for tax purposes.
Under Section 1411, the NIIT is payable by trusts as a separate taxable entity
on net investment income.157 This net investment income includes “income
which is derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business . . . [that is] (A) a
passive activity (within the meaning of section 469) with respect to the taxpayer,
or (B) a trade or business of trading in financial instruments or commodities (as
defined in section 475(e)(2)).”158
The interplay between state trust law and tax law arises when examining the
entity paying the tax for purposes of distinguishing active versus passive activity.

149

See I.R.C. § 11 (2014).

150

Maxwell v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 107 (1990).

151

See id.

152

See I.R.C. § 1561(a) (2014).

See id. § 641(a) (2014). “Grantor trust” refers to the concept that the trust grantor retains
sufficient interests in the trust that he or she remains the owner of the trust for income tax purposes.
See id. §§ 671–678.
153

154

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 70, 75 (2007).

155

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 261 cmt. (a) (1959).

156

See id. § 266.

157

See I.R.C. § 1411(a)(2) (2014).

158

I.R.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)(i), (2)(A)–(B) (2014).
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Under Section 469, “‘passive activity’ means any activity—(A) which involves
the conduct of any trade or business, and (B) in which the taxpayer does not
materially participate.” Regulatory guidance on material participation has been
hotly debated. Regulations under Section 469 provide guidance for assessing the
material participation of individuals, however, the regulations remain silent as to
the material participation of trusts. In determining the material participation of
trusts, tax attorneys must speculate as to the proper focus of the activity in order
to decide if the trust materially participates.159

IV. Proposed Regulatory Language
A. Proposal
In order to add clarity and reduce the difficulties posed by the trustee-only
test, the Treasury could adopt a rule using the following language (“Proposed
Language”) for Treasury Regulation Section 1.469-5T(g) that could govern
material participation of estates and trusts:160
Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.469-5T(g)
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (e) and (h)(2) of this
section, a trust shall be treated, for purposes of section
469 and the regulations thereunder, as materially participating in an activity for the taxable year if the trust
satisfies the requirements for individuals set forth in
paragraphs (a) through (d), through its trustee or trustees
and any agents thereof.
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, agents of the trustee
include income beneficiaries of the trust, the transferor
as defined in section 2652(a), and individuals contracted
by the trustee in an arms length transaction, who perform
services related to the trust activity.
This regulatory language recognizes that in order for a trust to materially
participate for tax purposes, an individual’s activity must be attributed to the
trust. The Proposed Language blends the position of the United States Tax
Court in Michigan with that of the Northern District of Texas. Frank Aragona
Trust holds that in the context of Section 469 “[s]ervices performed by individual
trustees on behalf of the trust may be considered personal services performed
159
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(g) (2013) (reserved for regulations regarding material
participation of trusts and estates).

Please note that material partial participation under § 1411 refers to the regulations under
§ 469. See also Net Investment Income Tax, 78 Fed. Reg. 72,934, 72,402 (Dec. 2, 2013).
160
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by the trust.”161 The Proposed Language uses the trustee as the anchor, but
aligns more closely with Carter Trust, where the court established that material
participation with respect to a trust “should be determined by reference to the
persons who conducted the business” on the trust’s behalf, including the trustee.162
The flexibility provided in the Proposed Language incorporates different trust
types and determines material participation “by reference to the persons who
conducted the business” on behalf of the trust.163
By deviating from Frank Aragona Trust, the Proposed Language addresses the
potential loophole created by the NIIT, which considers the situation where only
trusts with large business interests avoid the NIIT by having sufficient resources
to compensate a trustee to “materially participate within the business.”164 To
the extent trusts distribute all net investment income, zero NIIT is due at the
trust level.165

B. Possible Concerns Regarding the Proposed Language
As noted above, for Section 1411, material participation provides an escape
mechanism from the NIIT for trusts that have undistributed net income greater
than the trust’s adjusted net income over the “threshold amount” of $200,000.166
Eliminating situations in which a trust holds significant business interests167 that
generate adjusted net income in excess of the threshold amount, arguendo, the
material participation rules in the Section 1411 impact primarily trusts holding
family businesses in whatever form of entity.

1. Aggregating Activities—Self Employment Tax Alternative
By taking the position that the only activities that count toward material
participation are those of the trustee, the Tax Court imposes a backstop. Under
the Proposed Language, a trust with one trustee could theoretically designate each
income beneficiary as an agent, aggregate the total hours of active participation,
and satisfy the material participation requirement. In trusts with multiple income
beneficiaries, this scenario would require few hours on each individual to satisfy the
500 hour requirement in Temporary Treasury Regulation Section 1.469-5T(a)(1).

161

Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. No. 9, *1 (2014).

162

Carter Trust ex rel. Fortson v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541 (N.D. Tex. 2003).

163

Id. at 541 ¶ 6.

164

See I.R.C. §§ 1411(a)(2), (b) (2014).

165

Id. § 1411(a)(2).

166

See id. §§ 1411(a)(2), (b).

For purposes of the discussion in this section, business interests include all forms of flowthrough taxation.
167
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However, viewing the NIIT as an alternative to the self-employment tax, one
must look beyond trust taxation to determine the equity of this scenario under the
Proposed Language. Under this scenario, the underlying business income flows
through to the trust’s tax return, free of the NIIT, although subject to income tax
at trust tax rates in Section 1(e). Income beneficiaries receive distributions free of
any further income tax obligation because the trust paid the tax. This business
income escaped the self-employment tax at the individual income beneficiary’s
level and at the trust level via the NIIT. Assuming this taxpayer had received his
or her share of the business outright rather than in trust, income produced by
the business would be reported on the individual’s Form 1040, and would be
subject to either self-employment tax or the NIIT. Under this Proposed Language
and scenario, income beneficiaries could shelter income in a trust to avoid the
NIIT and the self-employment tax. However, for all but the highest marginal
bracket taxpayers, this strategy comes at a high cost. The compressed income tax
rates for trusts would cost more in tax than if the trust distributed the income to
the beneficiaries.
Of course, non-tax reasons exist for placing such an interest in trust—namely,
the assurance provided to grantors that a trustee oversees trust activities and can
ensure the proper management of trust assets, the business. Furthermore, the
business may not make distributions, and therefore the trust’s income tax covers
phantom income not easily distributed.
Taking the same scenario in which all trust income is distributed to the
income beneficiaries, a similar inequity would result between two income
beneficiaries in different marginal tax brackets. The income beneficiary with
adjusted gross income above the threshold amount would owe the NIIT, while
the income beneficiary below the threshold would not.168 By design of the statute,
Congress engaged in line-drawing. However, because the NIIT is separate from
the income tax, the question becomes whether a trust should escape the NIIT by
aggregating small activities of many income beneficiaries. Such instances would
occur when, but for that aggregated activity, NIIT would be due, either at the
trust level or at the income beneficiary’s level in the case of distributed net income.

2. Concerns About Insufficient Legislative Support for the
Proposed Language
Outside the ambit of Section 469, Section 2032A provides more descriptive
language for evaluating material participation in the estate and trust context.
Section 2032A provides for special use valuation of a decedent’s assets, which
enables executors of certain estates to value qualified real property at less than
their “highest and best” use.169 Under this exception for certain estates, “material
168

I.R.C. § 1411(a)(2), (b) (2014).

169

Id. § 2032A (2014).
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participation in the business by the decedent owner or a family member” is found
in one or more of four scenarios:
Where property is owned by a trust, the arrangement will
generally be found in one or more of four situations. First, the
arrangement may result from appointment as a trustee. Second,
the arrangement may result from an employer-employee rela
tionship in which the participant is employed by a qualified closely
held business owned by the trust in a position requiring his or
her material participation in its activities. Third, the participants
may enter into a contract with the trustees to manage, or take
part in managing, the real property for the trust. Fourth, where
the trust agreement expressly grants the management rights to
the beneficial owner, that grant is sufficient to constitute the
arrangement required under this section.170
In the Section 2032A context, which provides a favorable estate tax savings
through valuation, material participation focuses more so on the activities of the
decedent or family member of the decedent, rather than on the activities of the
trustee.171 Arguably, this results from the differences between Sections 469 and
1411, and 2032A. Sections 469 and 1411 involve the tax on income, which for
businesses in trust would be payable by the trustee if the trust has undistributed
income.172 Section 2032A focuses on the family members of the decedent as the
presumptive beneficiaries of the business. For Section 2032A, the executor, if
an unrelated person to the decedent, stands to benefit little from the valuation
of land included in the decedent’s estate. Assuming the focus of Section 2032A
is truly on the beneficiaries that stand to benefit from this Code Section, reason
suggests that Section 1411, and Section 469 for that matter, should focus on
the income beneficiaries of a trust rather than the trustee. For the hypothetical
small business placed in trust, should the Code focus on the actions the trustee
in the business when an able-bodied child beneficiary of the trust is also present?
Trustees obviously owe fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of a trust, but material
participation in a business to avoid the NIIT certainly is not a default fiduciary
duty owed. If Section 1411 followed more closely to Section 2032A for the trust
context, trust beneficiaries would bear the onus and the opportunity to materially
participate to avoid the NIIT.

3. Inequitable Treatment of Minor Beneficiaries v. Adult Beneficiaries
Next, we should consider the inequity that results when a business interest is
placed in trust for the benefit of minors compared to an interest placed in trust
170

Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3 (2013).

171

Id.

172

See I.R.C. §§ 469, 1411 (2014).
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for the benefit of able-bodied adults. A trust for minors more likely accumulates
income, thus increasing the likelihood that such a trust would owe the NIIT.173
Under the Proposed Language, where the beneficiaries are over the age of majority,
they may choose to participate in the business and avoid the NIIT. This inequity
extends beyond the direct scope of defining the material participation of a trust,
but it bears consideration as a consequence of the Proposed Language, or other
proposed guidance on this topic.
Non-tax reasons exist for accumulating income in the trust, such as the case
of minors. One may posit that minors cannot materially participate in a business
in trust, and thus have little choice but to have their trust income subject to the
NIIT, unless the trustee materially participates. However, such a result would also
occur if the income were distributed. Under the Proposed Language, however,
a trustee could delegate responsibilities such that an agent of the trustee alone
or in conjunction with the trustee could materially participate in the business
and alleviate the NIIT for the minor. Such a planning option would remain
unavailable if income were distributed. Even if the income was deemed net
investment income and subject to the NIIT, the tax applies to “passive income.”174
For all intents and purposes, trust income for the benefit of a minor is passive
income and no inequity results where the income is subject to a tax in the case of
a non-participating minor versus an actively participating adult beneficiary.175

4. Inequitable Treatment of Similarly Situated Taxpayers
The IRS would argue that the activities of an income beneficiary do not
count toward the determination of material participation by likening the income
beneficiaries to employees of a business owner and asserting that a business owner
does not materially participate in an enterprise solely by the actions of his or her
employees.176 The Tax Court would distinguish the trustee who is an employee
of the business from an income beneficiary who is also an income beneficiary
of the business.177 For trustees, “it is impossible to disaggregate the activities
they performed as employees of [the business], and the activities they performed
as trustees.”178 Although the Tax Court did not address whether a trust could

173
This presumes that the minor would not be able to spend the proceeds from the trust’s
earnings and the earnings would thus accumulate, because the minor would not be entitled to the
funds until he or she reaches majority.
174

See I.R.C. § 1411(c) (2014).

By way of analogy, compare the alleged inequity that results in this case with the imposition
of the “kiddie tax” under § 1(g) that taxes a minor’s net investment income in excess of $1,900 at
the minor’s parents’ marginal tax rate, which presumably exceeds the minor’s marginal tax rate.
175

176

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-29-014 (Apr. 7, 2010).

177

See supra notes 124–129 and accompanying text.

178

Frank Aragona Trust v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. No. 9, *7 (2014).
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materially participate via trust beneficiaries, the prevailing view by the IRS is no.179
Taking the law as it stands, a business interest left in trust would cost significantly
more for NIIT purposes than had the interest been gifted outright.
To illustrate, compare the business owner that leaves shares in an S Corporation
in an ESBT for his two children versus the business owner that left each child
a fifty percent interest in the business. To maximize each child’s threshold for
the maximum marginal rate for single filers, let’s assume the trust assets generate
income equal to $406,750 x 2, or $813,500.180 Let’s further assume that each
child works in the business a minimum of 500 hours per year.181
An ESBT earning $813,500 would pay income tax on that trust income for
a total tax of $322,146, or $161,073 per child.182 If each child held the interest
outright, the total tax paid by each child would be $118,118. The ESBT already
pays income tax that exceeds the amounts paid by a single filer by $38,222.05.
Assuming each child materially participates, neither child would owe the NIIT
if owning the S shares outright. However, under current precedent, if the shares
were held by the ESBT and the children were not trustees, then the trust would
pay $30,459 for the 3.8 percent NIIT on $813,500 of adjusted gross income.183
Eliminating all non-tax considerations, the ESBT in this scenario costs an extra
$116,367.184 Between an ESBT and another trust that distributes trust income,
no tax difference exists because the tax amount in either situation would equal
that calculated on the individual’s personal income tax return.
Under current law, an interest held in an ESBT inequitably treats income
beneficiaries that materially participate.185 Under the Proposed Language, the
179

See id. at *5.

180

See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.

181

See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) (2013).

ESBTs are taxed at the highest marginal tax rate for trusts set forth in § 1(e) of the code,
which is currently 39.6%. See I.R.C. § 641(c)(2)(A) (2014).
182

183

See I.R.C. § 1411(a)(2) (2014).

This calculation omits consideration for any transactions costs or deductions that would
reduce gross income and generate and “adjusted gross income” less than “gross income.” This extra
cost compares the aggregate income taxes paid by two single filers materially participating in a
business interest held personally versus two single filers materially participating in a business held
in an ESBT. The individual single filers pay tax according to the progressive rates in § 1. The ESBT
pays tax according to the rates in § 1(e), meaning the trust pays tax on all taxable income at the
highest marginal rate, 39.6%. In addition, the ESBT would pay the NIIT under § 1411(a)(2) on
the excess of any “adjusted gross income” over “the dollar amount at which the highest tax bracket
in section 1(e) begins for such taxable year.” § 1411(a)(2). Therefore, the 3.8% NIIT is applied to
a tax base equal to adjusted gross income less $11,950 in 2014.
184

185
As a counter, the transferor of the business could reorganize the business so as to avoid use
of the ESBT. The transferor could switch to a state-law LLC taxed as a partnership to avoid the
ESBT expense. However, the reorganization could subject the corporation to taxes upon changing
tax status. See I.R.C. § 1362 (2014).
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ESBT would pay a greater amount in income tax, but the trust would avoid the
NIIT. In cases where income beneficiaries’ work in the business contributes to the
earnings of the trust, regulatory guidance should recognize the contribution of
the income beneficiaries to avoid a tax on net investment income. The economic
reality in such instances suggests that income derived from a beneficiary’s activity
is not passive, but is active because the beneficiary’s actions constitute the test for
material participation on an individual level.

5. Purposes of the NIIT as Related to FICA
Given the purpose of the NIIT as a complement to wage taxes, the material
participation test may misalign with that purpose. If the NIIT is based on material
participation, it presumes that individuals who have an interest in a trust subject
to the NIIT are not otherwise employed. Requiring material participation as a
proxy for determining the NIIT poses a problem, not simply for the potential
loophole, but also because under its current construction, Section 1411 facilitates
the possibility of inequitably taxing trust earnings, whether or not the beneficiary
is employed by a business in the trust.186
Medicare funding has been sourced from “wages” since the inception of
Medicare in the 1960s.187 “Wages” as a legally operative term has been stretched
to its broadest logical bounds, yet still remains the legal predicate for the taxation
and subsequent funding of Medicare.188 “Wages,” however, are legally distinct
from “income” and other bases of taxation.189 For QSSTs and QTIP trusts that
distribute all trust income to beneficiaries, the NIIT applies at the individual level,
with material participation determined on behalf of the individual or individuals
reporting the income.190
If a taxpayer works and earns wages, his or her contributions to Medicare
constitute 1.45 percent of those wages.191 As discussed above, this flat tax does
not have any limit on the wage base.192 If the same taxpayer has an interest
in a trust such as a QSST or QTIP that is subject to the NIIT and the trust
does not materially participate, then the income from that trust will be taxed at
3.8 percent.193 If the taxpayer has income from the trust and wages, he or she

186

See supra notes 160 –165 and accompanying text.

187

See Stein, supra note 22 and accompanying text.

188

See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 709 (2011).

189

Cf. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2014).

See id. § 1411 (a)(1) (2014) (NIIT for individuals), id. § 1361(d) (2014) (QSST); id.
§ 2056(b)(7)(B) (2014) (QTIP).
190

191

See id. § 3121(b) (2014).

192

See id. § 3121(a)(1) (2014).

193

See id. § 1411 (2014).
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will contribute to Medicare at an effective rate between 1.45 percent and 3.8
percent.194 As the proportion of trust income to wages increases, the effective
rate increases. This article is not necessarily arguing for a lower rate, but rather
noting an inconsistent rate applied based on the source of the income. The
variance in the effective rate is not horizontally equitable because a taxpayer
who only earns wages of the same dollar amount will be forced to contribute to
Medicare at 1.45 percent. The material participation test for the NIIT creates a
contingency whereby taxpayers can choose to participate in order to avoid the
NIIT.195 This example merely demonstrates one instance where the mechanics of
the NIIT may produce inequity that regulations could remedy.
If an ESBT avoids the NIIT, then the trust pays income tax on earnings at
the trust’s tax rates, with the income beneficiaries receiving tax-free distributions.
If the income beneficiaries of the ESBT materially participated, then under the
Proposed Language, no self-employment taxes would be collected at either the
trust level or individual level; furthermore, no NIIT would be collected at either
level. Assuming the income beneficiary receives no wages, the trust distributions
to the ESBT income beneficiaries would pass free of employment taxes, selfemployment taxes, and net investment income taxes. This escape mechanism to
avoid FICA contributions comes, however, at a cost of the compressed income
tax rates for trusts. The ESBT income is taxed at the highest level of tax at 39.6
percent.196 A single filer would need to earn at least $406,750 to reach the marginal
rate of 39.6 percent.197 The additional 3.8 percent NIIT would not deter a person
from choosing another trust form and remaining passive, thus paying the NIIT.
In the ESBT scenario, where the trust receives no distribution deduction and
pays tax at the highest marginal rate of 39.6 percent, an additional 3.8 percent tax
would likely entice the trustee or trust beneficiaries to actively participate.

V. Conclusion
Until the enactment of the NIIT, little regulatory activity occurred with respect
to the material participation of estates and trusts. With the new NIIT, however,
many trust arrangements that hold business interests face the tax, but for the
exception of active participation. Under current guidance, a trust may materially
participate to the satisfaction of the IRS if the trust counts only the actions of the

194
Because no double taxation exists, the effective rate of tax in this scenario is calculated by
adding the total taxes paid, proportional share of NIIT and 1.45% of Medicare from employment
taxes, and dividing that total by the sum of the total proportion of trust income plus total wages.
The maximum effective rate would be 3.8%.

Please note that this discussion is with respect to § 1411. Passive activity loss rules are
contained within § 469.
195

196

See I.R.C. § 641(c)(2)(A) (2014).

197

See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
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trustee or co-trustees who can act with discretion and bind the trust. For purposes
of attributing actions to the trustee, the IRS disapproves of looking beyond the
actions of the trustees and aligns its position with an analogy to an employer’s
inability to count the actions of its employees for material participation.
The authors’ Proposed Language seeks to offer a regulatory solution in an
attempt to illuminate this area for practitioners and trustees. By bridging the
holdings in the cases in this area and the handful of PLRs and TAMs, the authors
sought to develop a regulation that addresses the concerns of commenters and
the legally supported positions taken in the existing case law. As a result, the
authors propose that the Code attribute the activities of trustees and agents
thereof to trusts for purposes of determining the material participation of a trust.
In conformity with the design of Section 1411, this regulation would appear in
the Section 469 regulations and would also govern the deductibility of losses from
passive activities.
Although looking to the trustee offers a bright-line rule, considering the
activities of the trustees and agents thereof more accurately reflects the economic
reality of material participation in the context of trusts with income beneficiaries
involved in the business held in the trust. The relationship between trustees
and beneficiaries is not directly analogous to a business owner and his or her
employees, and the attribution rule suggested herein would reflect that difference
and not be applied to the actions of a sole employer. In the normative sense, a
trust, as a taxpaying entity, materially participates when an income beneficiary
materially participates in the business. For now, the Code uses material participation
as the test for applying the NIIT to individuals and trusts. Treasury regulations
should recognize the distinct relationship between a trustee and the trust and
should consider the real-world operations of a trust for purposes of aligning the
regulations with the available guidance from Congress. If the overarching concern
beneath the IRS’s position is the funding of Medicare coffers, then perhaps a
test other than material participation should apply for estates and trusts. That,
however, remains a task for Congress, not the judiciary or the agency.
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